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Abstract
The conservation of fugitive natural resources across national boundaries poses signiﬁcant
challenges in Africa. This realisation has resulted in the creation of transfrontier parks. While
transfrontier parks help de-fragment wildlife habitats, in the presence of governance heterogene-
ity the same arrangements create uncertainty as they allow a diverse range of park managers
to make decisions about wildlife. This paper formulates a bioeconomic model to examine the
determinants of successful conservation of migratory wildlife across a transfrontier park with
patch heterogeneity. The examination shows three key results. Firstly, it is both ecologically
and economically worthwhile to establish a uniﬁed transfrontier park rather than have disjointed
national ones only if stronger governance institutions exist in higher-resource potential areas.
Secondly, the local communities will cooperate with transfrontier conservation eﬀort only if
they derive greater beneﬁt ﬂows from transfrontier park-based wildlife conservation than from
anti-conservation activities such as wildlife poaching. Thirdly, successful conservation requires
transfrontier arrangements that equalise the long-run costs and beneﬁts for all constituent part-
ners. Given the presence of patch and governance heterogeneity, successful elephant conservation
in Southern Africa requires that South Africa shares beneﬁts with Mozambique and Zimbabwe
despite their weaker institutions to prevent resource leakages from threatening the transfrontier
park.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There has been a growing realisation in natural resource management that the governance boundary
should be spread wholly over the ecological boundary in order for management decisions to have
complete eﬀects on the ecological system.1 Furthermore, correspondence between ecological and
governance boundaries reduces the likelihood of conﬂicting management decisions about segments
of the same ecological system. In dealing with fugitive natural resources such as wildlife, at an
international level in Southern Africa, this realisation has brought in its wake the creation of a good
number of transfrontier parks.
A transfrontier park is a protected area that spans across boundaries of multiple countries and
includes the removal of physical boundaries which might inhibit the free migration of animals and
humans. These areas are also referred to as Peace Parks as they have been promoted as political
constructs that can help foster peace between neighbouring countries. In many cases, to eﬀectively
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1Thus, one needs to ﬁrst clearly demarcate ecological boundaries before demarcating governance boundaries.
1link previously isolated national parks, additional non-proclaimed land may have to be appended
to the amalgamated block of land. The appropriate term to use in such contexts is transfrontier
conservation areas (TFCAs).2
The ﬁrst transfrontier park in Southern Africa was formally launched in 2000 with the establish-
ment of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park through the joining of the Kalahari Gemsbok National
Park and the Gemsbok National Park to create a park of 38,000km2. The second transfrontier park,
the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, was established in 2002 between the countries of South
Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, covering an area of 35,000km2. The park will eventually cover
100,000km2. The only other park to date which has been ratiﬁed through a treaty is the Ais-Ais/
Richtersveld Transfrontier Park which was ratiﬁed in 2003 between Namibia and South Africa, and
covers an area of 6,045km2, spans some of the most spectacular desert mountain scenery and includes
the world’s second-largest canyon.
Memorandums of agreement have been signed for four other Parks namely, the Limpopo-Shashe
(Botswana/South Africa/Zimbabwe), the Lubombo (Mozambique/South Africa/Swaziland), the
Maloti-Drakensburg (Lesotho/South Africa) and the Kavango-Zambezi (Angola/Botswana/Namibia/
Zambia/Zimbabwe). Five other areas are at diﬀerent stages of transfrontier arrangements:
the Liuwa Plain-Mussuma (Angola/Zambia), the Lower Zambezi-Mana Pools (Zambia/Zimbabwe),
the Chimanimani (Mozambique/Zimbabwe), the Iona-Skeleton Coast (Angola/Namibia) and the
Nyika/Kasungu/Lukusuzi (Malawi/Zambia).3
The removal of fences between adjacent international parks might help in the de-fragmentation
of wildlife habitats, which has long been recognised as a major cause of biodiversity loss particularly
in literature on large mammals. In some cases, transfrontier parks might also create an avenue
through which some overpopulated parks could be relieved of their excessive wildlife populations by
ﬁnding additional habitat in adjacent international parks.4 This is particularly the case if there is
spare capacity in the neighbouring international parks and, in that case, conservation in parks on
either side potentially stands to beneﬁt by the mere creation of a transfrontier park. It should also
be noted that these areas do not only allow for wildlife migration but encourage tourism, economic
development and goodwill between neighbouring countries as well as facilitating travel of indigenous
inhabitants of the area.
By giving wildlife access to more land, especially large-range species, transfrontier arrangements
are potentially conducive to sound conservation. However, in the presence of governance heterogene-
ity, transfrontier arrangements create uncertainty about the actual outcome as these arrangements
entail that a potentially more diverse range of managers get to make decisions about the wildlife.
Some of the key wildlife management decisions relate to interaction with the adjacent local communi-
ties who may or may not support wildlife conservation, depending on their perceptions about many
issues such as damage-causing animals, ownership of wildlife and sources of livelihood. In cases
where ineﬀective managers get to learn from their eﬀective counterparts how to manage wildlife
successfully, or where the eﬀective managers get to take over the bulk of the wildlife management
decisions, then wildlife will potentially be better oﬀ in aggregate. However, if the dominant group
of managers responds to perverse wildlife management incentives, then transfrontier parks could
actually open up more areas to wildlife mismanagement and loss.
2The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement
of 1999 deﬁnes a TFCA as “the area or component of a large ecological region that straddles the boundaries of two
or more countries, encompassing one or more protected areas as well as multiple resource use areas”.
3See http://www.peaceparks.org for more details.
4In some parks such as the Kruger in South Africa, elephant populations are exceeding carrying capacities. If this
situation continues unchecked it will adversely aﬀect the parks ecosystem. This has the eﬀect that the elephant’s
own habitat will be degraded and the habitats of other species will not be spared. This situation might also have
adverse economic consequences; for example, it may aﬀect tourism income opportunities. In isolation, countries with
overpopulations would have to take drastic measures such as culling. While such measures solve the conservation
problem they may attract the wrath of animal rights activists who vociferously campaign against them, thereby
adversely aﬀecting tourism opportunities.
2In light of the foregoing possible conﬂicting circumstances, there are no clear expected outcomes
from transfrontier park arrangements. In some cases, where the negative eﬀects outweigh the positive
eﬀects, transfrontier parks are undesirable constructs. But in other cases, where the positive eﬀects
outweigh the negative eﬀects, they may actually be the good way to go. Thus, there is a need for an
appraisal of when conservation might be successful or guidelines as to the conditions under which pro-
conservation countries should participate in such arrangements. In order to derive these guidelines
one should have answers to three key questions. Firstly, under what conditions is it better to have
either a transfrontier park or several disjointed national ones when dealing with fugitive natural
resources such as wildlife? Secondly, given that transfrontier parks are usually established in areas
with human communities, under what conditions might local communities be expected to cooperate
with transfrontier park management? Thirdly, if transfrontier arrangements are indispensable, what
threshold of governance institutions guarantee enhanced conservation?
This paper investigates the above-mentioned questions by formulating a bioeconomic model using
the context of conservation of a wildlife species such as the African elephant (loxodonta africana)5
in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. The model incorporates key considerations such as patch
heterogeneity, wildlife migration, and governance heterogeneity. The paper will show three key
results. Firstly, it is both ecologically and economically worthwhile to establish a uniﬁed transfrontier
park rather than have disjointed national ones only if stronger governance institutions exist in
higher-resource potential areas. Secondly, the local communities will cooperate with transfrontier
conservation eﬀort only if they derive greater beneﬁt ﬂows from transfrontier park-based wildlife
conservation than from anti-conservation activities such as wildlife poaching. Thirdly, successful
conservation requires transfrontier arrangements that equalise the long-run costs and beneﬁts for all
constituent partners.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on transbound-
ary conservation. Section 3 explains the methodology to be employed, after which the model is
formulated, presented and analysed. Section 4 discusses the policy implications of the model. The
conclusion is given in Section 5.
2 Literature Review
As highlighted earlier, TFCAs have gained popularity as a method of preserving and conserving
natural resources across political boundaries.6 TFCAs seek to eﬀectively integrate areas previously
segregated by political boundaries, to get them under a common management scheme, with the
aim for better conservation eﬀort. Munthali (2007) identiﬁes some of the main reasons for creating
TFCAs as the need to protect reserves that span across nations, the need to expand the total area
that is being utilised for wildlife activities, and the need to re-establish seasonal migration routes.
With poverty levels consistently high in most African countries, wildlife resources have also been
viewed as a tool that local communities and governments can use for the betterment of the lives of the
people around the reserves. Singh (1998), for example, takes the view that TFCAs oﬀer increasing
economic opportunities, diminish cultural isolation and may be used for community integration.
Thus, TFCAs can be viewed as vehicles with which to ﬁght for the twin goals of conservation and
development. There seems to be consensus that wildlife may impact positively on the lives of the
people around it, if it is eﬀectively managed.
While there is consensus and acknowledgement that TFCAs can have a huge impact on the
livelihood of communities, how these areas ought to be managed remains debatable. Büscher and
Dietz (2005) argue that instead of embracing communities in TFCAs, the older, more exclusionary
5In Southern Africa, the elephant is probably the single greatest factor inﬂuencing ecosystem conservation in
protected areas (DNPWLM 1999). Perhaps this points towards that governance boundaries should be along the
ranges of elephants and take refuge in it being both a keystone and umbrella species. Indeed the elephant range was
the key consideration in the establishment of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.
6This section uses the term TFCA as it is broader and encompasses a transfrontier park.
3approach should be taken. They argue that there is irrefutable evidence that African communities
have failed to harness the full potential of wildlife resources, with some communities which are well-
endowed with natural resources and which have been given ownership, failing to improve their lives.
While this view cannot be disregarded, as there indeed are numerous cases of failures by communities,
there are also cases of communities which have addressed both the conservation as well as the
economic goals. One example is that of the Makuleke clan which beneﬁt e df r o ml a n dr e s t i t u t i o ni n
the Kruger National Park of South Africa, a member of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.
The management of TFCAs is not without problems by virtue of their structure. One of the main
challenges faced is the exclusion of most stakeholders, as governments (or their conservation agencies)
generally assume full ownership of TFCAs (Munthali, 2007). Such alienation of other stakeholders
tends to prop up conservation objectives and override economic objectives. While conservation is the
uncontested main objective, other objectives such as the livelihood of the local communities should
also be considered, as these stakeholders potentially pose a threat to conservation eﬀort should they
not stand to beneﬁt from the areas. The TFCAs potentially aﬀect the communities by reducing
the size of area available for agricultural purposes in cases where rangeland is drafted-in, and by
perpetrating damage to crops and property when more animals from a larger animal population
wander outside the protected areas. Due to colonial history and diﬀerent perceptions around access
to resources and use between diﬀerent communities, misunderstandings are bound to arise, resulting
in non-cooperation (Munthali, 2007).
While parks may generally face ineﬀective management capacities, the level of coordination
needed in joint operations is higher than when dealing with individually managed resources. In
some cases, management capacity for this level of coordination may just not exist. Thus, TFCAs
may inherently have collective-action problems as more people have to be consulted and consensus
must be reached on all key decisions. In cases where payoﬀ structures are asymmetrical, and one
sub-area stands to beneﬁt more than the others, management views and objectives regarding the
way forward may be diametrically opposed.
Now consider the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP), in whose context this study is to
be shaped. Apart from the above-mentioned general issues that TFCAs face, GLTP has its own
challenges, of which the major ones will be revealed. As Saayman and Saayman (2006) point out,
there are extreme poverty levels amongst communities living around the TFCA.7 Such a situation
puts pressure on the GLTP from resource use by the local communities. A challenge that crops up is
that the management system will have to enhance enforcement against unsustainable illegal oﬀ-take.
Countries tend to diﬀer in the manner in which they execute their responsibilities. Some countries
might prefer to exclude local communities and use a more centralised approach to management, an
approach which historically has, in some cases, eﬀectively turned their portions of the TFCA into
de facto open-access areas due to ill-resourced, ineﬀective monitoring. Some might prefer to involve
local communities as a way to reduce resource-monitoring costs and increase resource protection.
There is a role for communities to play given that wildlife biological processes occur at small,
medium and large scales such that their eﬀective management requires that governance systems
are organised in multiple scales that are eﬀectively linked (Ostrom 1995).8 Countries that promote
congruence between the governance system and the biological process in wildlife conservation have
strong governance institutions. In this context, governance institutions refer to the rules, norms,
and strategies adopted by individuals as they interact with the resource, inter alia,a n de x i s ti n
the minds of the participants and are sometimes shared as implicit knowledge, rather than in an
explicit and written form (Ostrom 1999). Institutions include rules of behaviour, ways and means of
enforcing these rules, procedures for mediation of conﬂicts, sanctions in the case of breach of the rules,
7For instance, Limpopo and Mpumalanga provinces in South Africa, the provinces in which the Kruger National
Park is situated, are among the poorest provinces in the country.
8Thus the governance system must be as complex as the biological process it is trying to manage. It is not
uncommon to ﬁnd smaller-scale organisations that are nested within larger ones, each with its own distinct set of
rules (Ostrom 1995).
4and organisations supporting transactions. Institutions aﬀect the way in which exploitation of the
elephant resource can take place. Poaching is likely to be rampant in countries with weak governance
institutions, because poachers hunt without eﬀective restraint. Furthermore, local communities who
are adjacent to wildlife are likely to support and shield poachers as a way to protest their exclusion
from wildlife management. Of concern to local communities will be whether the creation of the
TFCA will entail costs for them in the form of (i) increased human-wildlife conﬂict given that there
is no guarantee that wildlife will not occasionally wander from the parklands into the rangelands,
and (ii) loss of traditional hunting and agricultural areas given that local parkland boundaries may
have to be redrawn to eﬀectively link the local park to the neighbouring ones. It will be diﬃcult to
establish TFCAs adjacent to communities who feel disenfranchised and stand to suﬀer large losses.
The creation of the TFCA will most likely see the emergence of new wildlife migration patterns
particularly across political boundaries, given that the quality of habitats is likely to diﬀer in the
diﬀerent parts of the TFCA. Also, animal instinct could be such that wildlife tends to escape from
areas characterised by high risk of illegal resource use, to safe sanctuaries. Thus, wildlife is likely
to be concentrated along certain routes or sanctuaries within the TFCA, with the result that access
to wildlife hotspots is unevenly distributed amongst the participating countries. Under these condi-
tions, the extent of beneﬁts generated9 from the TFCA by each party would therefore largely depend
on the extent of conscious infrastructural development.10 Evidence from the GLTP has shown het-
erogeneity in infrastructural development with serious backlogs in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. On
the Zimbabwean side (i.e. Gonarezhou Park), most roads are not tarred, in bad shape and mostly
accessible by oﬀ-road vehicles (Spenceley et al. 2008). The level of other tourist infrastructure
such as game lodges, viewing spots, telecommunication systems, road transfer facilities and other
recreational facilities is also not well developed, particularly on the Mozambican side. The South
African side (i.e. Kruger Park) can be described as the diametric opposite of the descriptions of
its two counterparts. For as long as migration is asymmetrical and infrastructural development is
heterogenous, beneﬁts and costs in the diﬀerent areas will not be the same. Furthermore, countries
that beneﬁt more from the TFCA are expected to invest more in its sustainability and in infrastruc-
ture which consolidates those beneﬁts. The heightened heterogeneous infrastructural development
ultimately leads to collective action problems.11 Thus, all participating countries ought to draw net
beneﬁts from the TFCA if conservation is to be enhanced.
These challenges probably explain why, to date, GLTP has fallen seriously short of quantiﬁable
deliverables despite much having been said about the potential of the project in terms of the possible
economic gains to the communities and biodiversity enhancement. Sceptics of the project argue that,
other than the relocation of a handful of elephants from Kruger to Gonarezhou, GLTP has perhaps
not achieved anything else. The motives behind the establishment of GLTP have also been called
into question a number of times, with the suggestion that South Africa stands to gain the most
and wanted to ﬁnd areas to where it could translocate excess elephants from Kruger at low cost.12
Some experts will, however, argue that this is not so much a numbers game but the creation of the
opportunity for elephants to be able to move around and it is their use of resources across time and
space that results in the success or failure of a TFCA.
Nevertheless, the point has been made that the extent of enhancement of conservation under
TFCAs will necessarily depend on the resultant payoﬀ matrix of conservation beneﬁts for the par-
9Country beneﬁts from TFCAs usually come in the form of benign tourism. Additional beneﬁts may be existence
values.
10A country might be better able to counter adverse wildlife migration eﬀects by putting in place mechanisms to
navigate to wildlife hotspots. Better still, the country might be able to make the habitat on its side more attractive
by, say, sinking waterholes to induce the wildlife to change its range.
11Given that wildlife will move to the other countries participating in and beneﬁting more from the TFCA, why
should a particular country make conservation sacriﬁces given the possibility that it might not eventually beneﬁtf r o m
them? The situation which might arise is akin to an international tragedy of the commons.
12The Kruger had an excessive elephant population and these had to be rid of, but without taking drastic action
such as culling which would have had bad publicity and taken a toll on tourism revenues.
5t i c i p a t i n gc o u n t r i e sa si ti sa ﬀected by at least two factors. Firstly, the wildlife migration patterns,
particularly those of large range and more valuable species given spatial heterogeneity. Secondly,
the nature of governance institutions in each of the participating countries, i.e. given the location
of most TFCAs, there is a need to craft those scenarios where wildlife conservation actually gains
from TFCAs.
3 The Model
The paper uses bioeconomic modelling, which takes into account the biological process of wildlife
as well as the economic incentives of people interacting with wildlife. The management actions of
humans will aﬀect the wildlife ecosystem and the wildlife ecosystem will in turn give its feedback by
changing the economic incentive structure of humans. By formulating a plausible model that captures
the biology-economics interactions, one may be able to predict the eﬀects of changing key parameters
of the model. Bioeconomic models have been formulated to investigate biology-economics interac-
tions especially for individual country situations, for example in investigating Integrated Community
Development Projects (ICDPs) (see Shulz and Skonhoft (1996), Skonhoft and Solstad (1996), Skon-
hoft and Solstad (1998) and Skonhoft (1998). Where transboundary resource management has been
investigated, ﬁsheries have tended to dominate, particularly migratory coastal ﬁsh species which
move across country borders (for example, Sanchirico and Wilen (2001)). For terrestrial species,
bioeconomic models have tended to focus on investigating the eﬀect of creating new protected ar-
eas in formerly open-access lands in a particular country ( for example, Johannesen and Skonhoft
(2004)). The proposed work will extend the discussion in the bioeconomic modelling literature to
include fugitive terrestrial resource management situations where countries come together to manage
jointly previously isolated national parks, where wildlife migration takes place across country bor-
ders and where there is heterogeneity of governance institutions of local communities living adjacent
to the TFCA.
This work is inspired by the African elephant in the context of the GLTP. Given that the
elephant frequently migrates across large areas, it is imperative to incorporate the dynamics of
elephant migration when analysing diﬀerent management regimes in the underlying sub areas. The
model will therefore incorporate the dynamics of elephant migration, elephant population growth,
oﬀ-take and the economic system under which the transfrontier park operates, to ﬁnd the eﬀects of
interventions on equilibrium values.
We start by discussing the possible modelling of elephant migration. We note that in the absence
of transboundary resource management the elephant inevitably migrates within each national park.
Since the focus of this paper is on transboundary resource management, we take isolated national
park internal migration for granted and instead focus on migration across the diﬀerent political
jurisdictions of the GLTP.13 There are three main types of animal migration which are potentially
of interest to this discussion: (i) seasonal migration, (ii) symmetric density-dependent migration,
and (iii) asymmetric density-dependent migration.
With seasonal migration, the species moves from habitat to habitat dependant on the season,
in search for food.14 Even though the African elephant has been known to migrate across vast
distances each season it is inconceivable that such migration can take all elephants completely from
13This refers to the areas in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa.
14Several terrestrial species show this form of migration in Africa. An example is the seasonal migration of the
wildebeest, zebra and gazelle from Serengeti national park to the Masai Mara reserve in search of food depending
on the rainfall patterns. The Serengeti-Mara ecosystem as a whole covers some 25,000-32,000 km2 (Ronald et al.,
1989) and there is a signiﬁcant rainfall gradient throughout the ecosystem, with some areas receiving an annual
rainfall of only 800mm and others over 2,000mm. It is this kind of vast diﬀerence that then makes it possible for
seasonal migration, where the species move from one area completely to the other, as the climatic conditions allow for
diﬀerent vegetation, nutritional value and carrying capacity per unit area. In other contexts outside the Serengeti-
Mara migration, these animals stay in the game reserve for most of the year, but all migrate outside the reserve into
the surrounding environment in search of better pasture in the dry season (Fryxell et al, 1995).
6one political jurisdiction of the GLTP to another. Symmetric density-dependant migration occurs
between habitats whose natural conditions are generally identical. Modelling elephant migration as
symmetric would imply that, throughout the transfrontier park, the physical quality of the habitat
and the quality of food are identical. Therefore, the elephants would be distributed evenly, and
there would be a positive ﬂow of animals to that area whose density becomes lower. This however
is hardly practical as the geographical characteristics are not the same everywhere within the park.
With asymmetric density-dependant migration, species are sensitive to extraordinary circumstances
in their habitat, e.g. dangers such as predation and competition, and opportunities such as abundant
water and food. In equilibrium, therefore, there would be more elephants per unit area in the
preferred habitat, but there will still be some elephants, albeit in lower densities, elsewhere.
Drawing from the work of Sanchirico and Wilen (2005), Skonhoft and Armstrong (2005) and
Armstrong and Skonhoft (2006), the mathematical model for asymmetric density-dependant mi-
gration of elephants across the diﬀerent political jurisdictions in GLTP is formulated below. Even
though the GLTP comprises of three political jurisdictions, for simplicity, we assume that it consti-
tutes of two spatial patches — patches 1 and 2.15 The net migration rate from patch 1 to patch 2 at








The coeﬃcient of transboundary movement (dispersal), m, shows the intrinsic dispersal rate of the
elephant between the two patches. A low coeﬃcient denotes low rates of migration between the
patches, while a high coeﬃcient exhibits higher dispersal. The parameter α is used to capture the
preferences of the elephant for a particular patch. If α<1 then there is a preference for patch 1 while
α>1 indicates preference for patch 2. If α =1then the elephant is indiﬀerent between the patches
and migration follows the symmetric density-dependent pattern. The preferences in this case are
assumed to be largely shaped by diﬀerent levels of non-anthropogenic danger and opportunities in
the two patches, e.g. predator-prey relations and competition with other species.17 The model will
designate the preferred patch as patch 1. S1t and S2t are the total stocks of the elephant at time t
in patches 1 and 2 respectively, while K1t and K2t are the respective elephant-carrying capacities.
The term Sit/Kit, i =1 ,2 captures density-dependent migration while α captures its asymmetric
nature. In a similar way, the net migration rate from patch 2 to patch 1 can be deﬁned and denoted
by M2t where, simply put, M2t = −M1t because whatever net elephant stock leaves patch 1 will
necessarily have gone to patch 2.
The presence of heterogeneity of the physical conditions in the diﬀerent patches gives the pos-
sibility of more favourable elephant growth in one of the patches. Thus, the model assumes that
there is a diﬀerence in the intrinsic growth rates ri of the elephant between the two patches. Given
that the model labels the preferred patch as patch 1, the diﬀerence in intrinsic growth rates between
the two patches implies that r1 >r 2. It is assumed that the natural growth of the elephant fi for
patch i =1 ,2 is dependent on the post-migration stock (Sit −Mit) and follows the logistic function
as follows:







Some management will be required to keep the elephant stock within an acceptable range in each
patch. It is therefore assumed that, at the end of each period and for each patch i =1 ,2,a
15Making use of more complex mathematical manipulations, the results from a two-patch model can be extended
to the three-patch model.
16This model allows for ﬂexibility on the assumptions about migration. The parameter m can be varied from species
to species as diﬀerent species have diﬀering rates of movement. Species with a high degree of spatial movement will
have a large value of m as opposed to those with minimal movement, which would record a much lower value. For
any species, this parameter would be constant, and determined through empirical studies.
17In other cases, the preferences may be shaped by diﬀerent hunting pressure and other human activities (e.g.
culling, poaching, perennial man-made waterholes) in the two patches.
7certain amount of elephants Hit will be captured and sold oﬀ to game farms and nature reserves
with the capacity to manage them eﬀectively (this is a common occurrence in the South African
wildlife sector).18 In addition to this oﬃcial oﬀ-take, there is also an oﬀ-take Pijt poached by human
community j =1 ,2 living adjacent to each patch i =1 ,2, which is a function of anti-poaching eﬀort
Ait, poaching eﬀort EP
ijt and elephant stockSit as will be elaborated later.19 It should be noted that
we have deliberately chosen to index patches by i and communities by j as we will demonstrate
that community characteristics are not necessarily congruent with patch characteristics, i.e. good
communities are not necessarily located adjacent to preferred patches.
Now bringing migration, growth and oﬀ-take together, the rate of change of the total stock of
the elephant in patch i =1 ,2 can be represented as follows:
dSit
dt



















− Hit − Pijt(Ait,EP
ijt,S it) (4)
Legal elephant beneﬁts are in the form of two main sources of revenue: the ﬁrst arising directly
from tourism20 and the second from proceeds of the sale of live game Hit to game farms and nature
reserves.21 It is assumed that beneﬁts from tourism are directly related to the stock of elephants.22
Thus, the total beneﬁts Bit in patch i =1 ,2 are a function of the stock levels Sit and oﬀ-takes Hit
for i =1 ,2 i.e.
Bit = Bit(Sit,H it) (5)
The costs incurred by the conservation authorities are in the form of habitat management (water-
holes, ﬁreguards, etc) and tourism infrastructure (gravel roads, viewing spots, lodges, etc). The main
cost of keeping elephants is the regulation of the size of the herd. They would need to be tracked,
provided with suﬃcient waterholes and fenced-oﬀ from human settlement areas and so forth. While
this involves material provision, it also entails costly anti-poaching enforcement eﬀort Ait for i =1 ,2
targeted towards the illegal hunting by adjacent human communities. The other cost accruing to
the park is that of capturing the live game Hit for sale. Thus, total costs Cit in patch i =1 ,2
are assumed to be directly dependent on the stock of elephantSit,t h eo ﬃcial oﬀ-takes Hit,a n d
anti-poaching enforcement eﬀorts Ait i.e.
Cit = Cit(Sit,H it,A it) (6)
18Being a keystone species and an umbrella species, elephants are the single most inﬂuential species that aﬀects
the dynamics of the TFCA. They have the capacity to overexploit their natural habitat if they exceed the carrying
capacity, but at lower numbers they can increase biodiversity and spatial distribution of other animals (Baxter, 1996).
If stock management is not done on a continuous basis, drastic measures might become necessary in the future.
Should the elephant population exceed its carrying capacity, the species will break into neighbouring areas for food,
thus costing the parks in terms of compensation. As an extreme measure, the elephants have to be culled, within the
context of compensation for damage-causing animal impacts on neighbouring communities. Thus it is in the park’s
interest to rid of excess elephants.
19Poaching is assumed to follow the Schaefer function of the form Pijt = e(Ait)EijtSit where e(Ait) is the oﬀ-take
per unit of eﬀort, Eijt.
20The African elephant continues to fascinate many people and is considered an appealing animal, partly due
to its size, charisma and the imminent threat of danger that always comes with being close to one (Reynolds and
Braithwaite, 2001). It is because of this special appeal that tourists have continued to ﬂock to the wildlife reserves in
Africa.
21These proceeds are not derived from hunting, but from translocating live animals to game farms and nature
reserves to further their conservation eﬀort. In cases where consumptive use is allowed, this would have included
proceeds from trophy hunting, once-oﬀ concessionary sales of ivory, sale of game meat and any other wildlife-related
products.
22It seems plausible to model tourism beneﬁts as depending on the elephant stock for three reasons. Firstly, we
abstract from the notion that tourism is a function of an index of biodiversity, because we are dealing with a one-
species model. Secondly, more people are likely to be attracted by a larger elephant population, as they would be
guaranteed of viewing it. Thirdly, as a keystone and umbrella species, elephants indirectly regulate the total stock
of other species in the park through the dispersal of seeds and regulation of veld types. These activities ultimately
aﬀect the stocks of all the other animals and thereby improve the index of biodiversity within the range of interest.
83.1 Managing a uniﬁed transfrontier park
After pulling the fences down, the conservation authorities come up with a shared long-run vision
and conservation strategy. They will use the anti-poaching enforcement eﬀort Ait and the oﬃcial
oﬀ-take Hit for i =1 ,2 as control variables. It is assumed that the uniﬁed transfrontier park is
































The initial elephant stock level is Si0 = S0
i for i =1 ,2. The current value Hamiltonian is:
HC =
P2

















− Hit − Pijt(Ait,EP
ijt,S it)
i (9)


















− λi =0 fori=1 ,2 (11)
dλit
dt





































− Hit − Pijt(Ait,EP
ijt,S it)fori=1 ,2
(13)
The interpretation of condition (10) is that the transfrontier park authorities will invest in anti-
poaching enforcement until the value of abated additional poaching is equated to the marginal cost
of such enforcement. From condition (11), the size of the oﬃcial oﬀ-take will be set at a level at
which the beneﬁt from the additional unit harvested equals its marginal cost. The marginal cost of
removing an additional unit of wildlife is made up of two components, harvest cost and opportunity
cost. Equations (12) and (13) are the co-state equations. Along the optimal eﬃcient path, the rate







































it as functions of Mit and EP
ijt, inter alia, if given speciﬁc functional forms. It
should be noted that EP
ijt is taken by the parks agency as given from some optimisation algorithm of
local communities. How does the solution presented above compare to the steady-state equilibrium
values which can be obtained from several disjointed national parks?
93.2 Managing several disjointed national parks
Without pulling down the fences, there will be no transboundary migration. However, each park
will still be assumed to maximise the present value of net beneﬁts NBi inter-temporally, by using
anti-poaching enforcement eﬀort Ait and the oﬃcial oﬀ-take Hit as control variables. The nature of
the problem can be structured and solved as before. While the objective function remains the same,









− Hit − Pijt(Ait,EP
ijt,S it)fori=1 ,2 (8’)
Thus, all terms denoting migration drop out due to its absence. Along the optimal eﬃcient path,




































it as functions of EP
ijt, inter alia, if given speciﬁc functional forms. It should
be noted that the above solution assumes that EP
ijt does not change from the level presented earlier.
Furthermore, in the current case the steady-state equilibrium values are not a function of Mit.I n
particular, a comparison of equations (14) and (15) shows that it makes a diﬀerence whether there is
a transfrontier park or several disjointed national ones. In equation (14), there are additional terms
accounting for transboundary migration. Even though the net migration across the transfrontier
park will be zero, there will be a stock eﬀect with transboundary migration which would not exist


































With transboundary migration, elephants are likely to reduce the time they spend running away
from danger within a restricted area and spend more time breeding in preferred habitats. Thus,
without a uniﬁed transfrontier park there would be certain stocks in each patch, which yield a certain
aggregate stock. However, with the uniﬁed transfrontier park there will be migration to that patch
where a greater per unit growth will be experienced. Thus transboundary migration potentially
yields additional overall growth, for given levels of EP
ijt.
We can point out a typical case in which a transfrontier park would be a better tool for con-
servation as opposed to several disjointed parks. If patches 1 and 2 are demarcated along political
boundaries, then natural migration patterns and breeding grounds might be compromised. For ex-
ample, patch 1 might encompass the main breeding habitat, but due to political fencing, the species
as a whole may not have adequate access to this. This ultimately aﬀects the rate of growth, which
would be lowered since migration patterns and breeding grounds are restricted. A single transfron-
tier park allows for natural spatial dispersal of species by removing artiﬁcial barriers and allowing
for management according to ecosystem boundaries. This will result in increased biodiversity and a
higher stock of animals.23
As we have shown above, transfrontier parks make ecological sense. Economically, whether there
is a diﬀerence between having a transfrontier park or several disjointed national ones will depend
23Furthermore, an eﬀectively managed transfrontier park will result in lower running costs due to the scale eﬀect.
In the case of a present-value maximising owner, a larger park will have lower overhead costs per person who visits
the park, as the owners take advantage of increasing returns to scale on revenues and proceeds. Instead of incurring
the same overheads, overheads are split among the diﬀerent areas proportionately and this increases the net beneﬁts
available for distribution, either to the owners for more conservation beneﬁt, or to the local communities to buy
out their poaching activities. Considering this scale eﬀect we conclude from a conservation perspective that a single
transfrontier park is better than several disjointed national ones.
10largely on governance issues as they determine the threat facing the potential incremental stock
growth in a uniﬁed transfrontier park. If governance institutions remain the same across a uniﬁed
transfrontier park and several disjoint ones, as in EP
ijt being ﬁx e da tag i v e nl e v e l ,t h e no n es h o u l d
also favour the uniﬁed transfrontier park on economic grounds just like the conservationist would. In
the steady state, harvest should be equal to growth. The fact that aggregate growth under a uniﬁed
transfrontier park is potentially greater, must mean that there would be both a higher elephant
stock and oﬀ-take, and hence more beneﬁts compared with the disjointed-parks case. However, if
the governance institutions diﬀer under the uniﬁed transfrontier park, such that EP
ijt diﬀers between
the two states, then that will also aﬀect both the stock and oﬀ-take, in which case a closer look
would be needed to determine which way it goes when compared with the disjointed-parks case.
3.3 Managing a transfrontier park in the presence of heterogeneity of
governance institutions
The governance system in wildlife conservation inevitably involves a number of stakeholders. The
actions of all these stakeholders are important determinants of success or failure of conservation. In
particular, one of the key issues that impact the success or failure of conservation eﬀort in Southern
Africa is the involvement of the local communities. Local communities are considered to be those
people who live within and/or around the boundaries of the transfrontier park. They engage in
two main activities, agricultural production and illegal hunting. Illegal hunting usually comes as a
natural alternative, because of the history associated with the establishment of national parks where
local communities where driven away from their traditional lands. It is assumed that the individual
members of a particular community have the same preferences and production capacities and thus
can be collapsed into one representative agent.24 However, there are diﬀerences between community
groups. For simplicity, we assume that the nature of community groups is shaped by the political
jurisdictions within which a community is located.25
Communities may or may not support conservation. Communities may disrupt conservation
eﬀort because it denies them access to agricultural land. Proclamation of conservation areas may
involve relocating people to other areas or reducing the size of their farmland. Damage-causing
animals also destroy their crops and, in cases without well-deﬁned property rights, communities
may have distaste for any governance system imposed on them, with regards to how they may or
may not interact with the wildlife around them subject to a sense of ownership, or a lack thereof.
It is therefore crucial that in transfrontier park management, the local communities are involved to
the extent that their objectives and those of the conservation authorities are synchronised. Without
this synchrony, the conﬂi c to fi n t e r e s tt h a tw o u l dr e s u l tm a yc a u se the conservation objectives to fall
short of their potential. In the case of transfrontier parks, this problem poses a bigger challenge than
internally contained reserves as, due to their size, there could be signiﬁcant populations to consider.
Management authorities have to ﬁnd a way to deal with this possible threat to conservation.
The general consensus in the literature is that local people will cooperate with conservation
eﬀort as long as they stand to beneﬁt from the cooperation (see Swanson and Barbier 1992; Mangel
et al., 1996; Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2004). What is this level of beneﬁtt h a tt h e yr e q u i r et o
cooperate? In other words, what are the necessary conditions that should prevail before the locals
may be expected to cooperate with conservation eﬀorts? To consider this, it is initially assumed
that property rights solely belong to resource owners who maximise inter-temporal net beneﬁts and
the rate of return obtained from the park is as in equation (14), shown earlier.
With no community property rights, all forms of community-perpetrated hunting are illegal, but
24The same assumptions have been applied elsewhere e.g. Johannesen and Skonhoft (2004).
25Furthermore, the way in which political jurisdictions will shape community groups is not necessarily consistent
with the way they shape conservation, i.e. it is possible to have a preferred wildlife habitat adjacent to a community
which is not supportive of conservation. As in the case of the GLTP, these people actually belong to diﬀerent countries
and the nature of beneﬁts and costs they face from the transfrontier park would be diﬀerent.
11it is impossible for the park authorities to exclude the communities completely. Thus, each commu-
nity j =1 ,2 has two sources of subsistence; i.e. it can exert eﬀort EP
ijt on illegal hunting (poaching
the elephant) in the park or use eﬀort EY
ijt to carry out agricultural production. As mentioned
earlier, the poaching related oﬀ-take Pijt is a function of anti-poaching enforcement Ait, poaching
eﬀort EP
ijt and the stock size Sit. The imputed value of poached output is πPPijt(Ait,EP
ijt,S it)
where πP is the price of illegal harvest. It is assumed that agricultural output Yjt is a function of
agricultural eﬀort only.26 The imputed value of agricultural output is πY Yjt(EY
ijt) where πY is the
price of agricultural output. Whichever way eﬀort is used, it is comes at a cost i.e. CY
j (EY
ijt) is the
cost of agricultural eﬀort and CP
j (EP
ijt) is the cost of poaching eﬀort, where each of these costs is
assumed to diﬀer between communities; i.e. there is a diﬀerence in the ease with which agricultural
production and poaching can be conducted by each community for the same amount of eﬀort.
In order to investigate the eﬀects of governance institutions on conservation, we start from the
premise that there exists heterogeneity in governance institutions in the two communities.27 In the
narrow sense, institutions determine the costs associated with resource exploitation. One way of
modelling the eﬀect of governance institutions on costs is CP
j (EP
ijt,G j) where Gj is an index of the
strength of governance institutions and dCP
j ÁdGj > 0. However, for clarity of exposition of the role
of governance institutions, it suﬃces to use the simple case where Gj ∈ {0,1} and ∆CP
j Á∆Gj > 0.
Thus, we will categorise institutions as either anti-conservation or pro-conservation based on whether
they make it easy or diﬃcult for elephant poaching.
It is assumed that CP
1 <C P
2 , which implies that community 1 has anti-conservation institutions
as it is prone to extracting more elephant oﬀ-take per unit of poaching eﬀort. Similarly, community
2 has pro-conservation institutions. Furthermore, it is assumed that each of the communities will
select that allocation of eﬀort between its two sources of livelihood so as to maximise net beneﬁts
subject to the total availability of eﬀort in each period (i.e. EY
ijt + EP
ijt = ¯ E which implies that
EY
ijt = ¯ E − EP
ijt). Having no property rights over the elephant and therefore no guarantee for long-
term hunting access, the communities will not take the stock dynamics into account. Thus, the
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forj =1 ,2 (19)
From the ﬁrst order condition, one can solve for the equilibrium value of EP∗
ijt if given speciﬁc
functional forms. When maximising beneﬁts, each community will allocate extra eﬀort to either
agriculture or illegal hunting until the marginal net beneﬁts between illegal hunting and agricultural
production are equalised. The inter-community poaching levels cannot be easily compared as they
26It is true that agricultural productivity varies from season to season, depending on variables such as rainfall,
natural disasters, the area under cultivation, fertilizer and pesticides and agricultural eﬀort used. However, given
the prevalence of labour-intensive agricultural production in most of the communities in question, the amount of
time spent working on the land, i.e. agricultural eﬀort, is the largest determinant of ﬁnal agricultural output. This
assumption allows us to focus on the impact of the community decisions on conservation.
27Governance institutions can be broad so as to encompass actions of all stakeholders. However, for simplicity we
only deﬁne them in very localised contexts of local communities’ interaction with wildlife.
12depend on so many factors, e.g. productivity of agricultural eﬀort in each community, unit costs
of agricultural eﬀort in each community, productivity of poaching eﬀort in each community and for
each patch, and the unit cost of poaching eﬀort in each community. However, if we assume away all
of these diﬀerences28 except that relating to unit costs of poaching eﬀort in each community, so as
to assess the eﬀect of heterogeneity of governance institutions, the diﬀerence in the cost functions of
poaching eﬀort will entail that community 1 invests more poaching eﬀort than community 2. Thus,
community 1 poses no substantial threat to the elephant resource while community 2 poses a greater
threat to the elephant resource.
As mentioned earlier, we have deliberately chosen to index patches by i and communities by
j as we will demonstrate that community characteristics are not necessarily congruent with patch
characteristics; i.e. good communities are not necessarily located adjacent to preferred patches.
Thus, the model describes a favourable patch 1, an unfavourable patch 2, a good community 1 and
a bad community 2. The favourable patch has higher stock growth eﬀects, which are beneﬁcial
t oau n i ﬁed transfrontier park. The good community has pro-conservation institutions, which are
potentially beneﬁcial to a uniﬁed transfrontier park. Therefore, the presence of heterogeneity of
patches and governance institutions opens up the possibility of two conservation outcomes from a
uniﬁed transfrontier park, depending on whether or not there exists a complementary matching of
patches and communities:
• If community 1 lies adjacent to patch 1 (i.e. j = i) then a uniﬁed transfrontier park will yield
more conservation and economic beneﬁts, as more of the elephant resource is adjacent to a
good community, and hence gets more protection. Similarly, if community 2 lies adjacent to
patch 2 then a uniﬁed transfrontier park will yield more conservation and economic beneﬁts
as less of the elephant resource becomes threatened by a bad community.
• If community 1 lies adjacent to patch 2 (i.e. j 6= i) then a uniﬁed transfrontier park will
not be beneﬁcial on conservation and economic grounds as less of the elephant resource gets
protection from the good community. Similarly, if community 2 lies adjacent to patch 1, then
a uniﬁed transfrontier park will not yield more conservation and economic beneﬁts, as more of
the elephant resource becomes threatened by a bad community.
The physical conditions of patches, which determine whether they are favourable or not, are
generally visible. It is usually the existence of possibilities to partner parks with favourable patches
which drives calls for uniﬁcation of international parks. It is also believed that habitat assessments
are always conducted before ratiﬁcation of any such uniﬁcation proposals. This is usually the case
because calls for uniﬁcation come from conservationists whose expertise lies in the ecological sciences.
In our view, an assessment of the compatibility of joining patches on ecological grounds constitutes
only one of at least two layers of conservation which need to be considered. Governance institutions
constitute the second layer of conservation which also needs to be assessed, so that uniﬁcation only
gets recommended when it would yield successful conservation, as represented by patches of high-
conservation potential only being partnered with pro-conservation governance institutions; i.e. the
j = i scenario in the model. However, the nature of community governance institutions is not
obviously discernible.29 In the absence of an assessment of governance institutions, there is a risk
of blindly supporting an economically and ecologically unproductive creation of transfrontier parks.
The governance institutions that are needed for transfrontier parks to be worthwhile economically
and ecologically, are those that engineer a social system which sets the costs of poaching at a
prohibitively high level, so as not to reverse the gains brought about by the incremental stock
28This is likely plausible since both communities live on marginal land. Otherwise it essentially represents the



























. Otherwise the minimum condition is that the sum of
their inﬂuence should not negate the potential incremental stock growth in a transfrontier arrangement.
29Neither can this be successfully assessed by scientists whose expertise lies outside social sciences.
13growth generated by uniﬁcation of national parks. Obviously, such institutions ought to co-exist




























The reason why eﬀort is allocated to poaching at all is that it yields a return and a better one
than not poaching. One way of eliminating poaching would be to displace the illegal wildlife-related
incomes with legal wildlife-related incomes. As long as the ﬂow of beneﬁts from the legal wildlife-
related activities to each community in each time period is greater than the marginal net beneﬁtf r o m
their alternative sources of livelihood, from an economic incentive point of view, each community
has no reason to disrupt conservation eﬀort. Thus, as long as the resource owner can transfer to
the communities a visibly wildlife-based ﬂow of net beneﬁts per season at least equal to the returns
from poaching, then this allows communities to maximise welfare and shift their use of eﬀort from
anti-conservation to pro-conservation activities.30 The key aspect is that the communities should
see a direct link between conservation and the income ﬂows.
While the transfrontier park generally gets more revenues from the patch with the preferred
habitat, some of these beneﬁts would need to be used in those areas where the stock of the elephant
is most threatened from human interaction, e.g. where the community costs of poaching are generally
lower. Thus, there is a need for inter-jurisdiction transfer of revenues for use in displacing poaching
for the general good of the whole transfrontier area. Transfrontier resource management can therefore
not be successful in cases where participating national conservation authorities each seek to maximise
their own beneﬁts without regard to revenues earned by other partners.
In the GLTP situation, it seems that South Africa is managing to attract more tourists, get-
t i n gah i g h e rl e g a lo ﬀ-take and consequently generating more revenues than its two counterparts,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Ultimately, the transfrontier park arrangement will only be success-
ful in conserving the elephant if some of those revenues earned by South Africa are used in those
jurisdictions where more conservation threats are found, even if it were in the two counterparts to
South Africa. Thus, for transfrontier arrangements to really work, the whole park must be managed
as a single unit with the possibility of inter-jurisdiction revenue transfers between its constituent
sub-units. This does not seem to be happening currently and might be a source of the arrangement’s
future failure. This is likely to happen because of the weak governance institutions on the Mozam-
bican and Zimbabwean sides. For instance, there have been some reports of human communities
living inside the park on the Mozambican and Zimbabwean sides. In the absence of clear incentives
systems for these communities, they may actually become the conduit of resource leakage and not
only threaten the resource populations in their respective jurisdictions, but also those on the rest of
the transfrontier park.
The key requirement for the use of the transfrontier funds should be for them to help increase the
costs of poaching. In reality there are many ways through which this outcome can be generated. It
seems that making disbursements to local communities as part of payments for ecosystems services
(PES), beneﬁt-sharing schemes, etc, to enhance their institutions, might work more directly to solve
the problem. Using the funds to enhance anti-poaching enforcement in other jurisdictions might
also work, but perhaps not in a cost-eﬀective manner.
Despite our focus on the role of governance institutions at a local level, we have also alluded to
the fact that there are other conditions crucial for the success of transfrontier parks. Some of these
conditions require actions from actors external to the local communities. For instance, governments
30Transfrontier parks should be cheaper to manage in areas whose communities face very limited poaching possi-
bilities as compared to communities who have wider such possibilities.
14should primarily ensure congruent legislation between countries involved. Disparities in legislation
give rise to unequal beneﬁt schemes and this would result in an imbalance of beneﬁts from the
transfrontier park. In cases where this occurs, local communities will beneﬁt unequally and this
might lead to a breakdown in cooperation in some areas. In the case of the African elephant in
GLTP, governments should ensure that all legislations pertaining to the species is the same in all
the three countries. Rules pertaining to the movement, control and export of the animals have to be
aligned such that there is a common base for operation between the countries involved. Of particular
importance are the rights and responsibilities of the local people and their constitutional rights. In
cases where constitutions state that the local people may not be moved, complex implications may
arise where the area under management has to be increased for greater conservation, for example.
Governments should seek to restore natural ecosystem boundaries and equalise management
capacity between the diﬀerent countries. Between the three countries involved in the GLTP, in-
frastructural diﬀerences are huge and this aﬀects the conservation eﬀort. It results in habitat quality
diﬀerences, which in some cases will result in lower stock levels. Using the migration functional form
assumed in this paper, a habitat which allows for restraint of poachers will have a higher stock of
animals. This will lead to less harvesting costs and increased tourism revenue for the park authori-
ties. The area will thus gain at the expense of the other and a breakdown of the relationship may
follow.
Governments should align conservation goals between countries. Conservation ideas and ap-
proaches vary and this may lead to conﬂict when the goals of the transfrontier park are diﬀerent
between countries. A country whose elephant population is thriving may be concerned more about
eﬃcient extraction of beneﬁts and less about preservation. In such cases there would be conﬂict and
conservation eﬀort will stall. To this eﬀect, government should ensure identical park management
regimes. Governments should ensure that all park authorities in the three countries take this view in
their management. The same management regimes will ultimately align cost structures and beneﬁt
ﬂow, and this will result in cooperation.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The conservation of fugitive natural resources across national boundaries poses signiﬁcant manage-
ment challenges. This realisation has brought in its wake the creation of transfrontier parks. Indeed,
the removal of fences between adjacent international parks might help in the de-fragmentation of
wildlife habitats, which has long been recognised as a major cause of biodiversity loss, particularly
in literature on large mammals. However, in the presence of governance heterogeneity, the same
arrangements create uncertainty about the actual outcome, as the transfrontier arrangements entail
that a more diverse range of managers get to make decisions about these resources. This paper
formulates a bioeconomic model to investigate and analyse the factors inﬂuencing the successful
conservation of migratory wildlife across adjacent international protected areas. The paper begins
by an analysis of whether it is better to have a single transfrontier park or several disjointed national
ones. From a conservation perspective, a single transfrontier park is better, as it introduces a stock
eﬀect from transboundary migration, with potentially higher growth rates of species, due to habitat
preservation and maintenance of seasonal patterns and breeding grounds. This ultimately increases
conservation and biodiversity. However, it is only better, both ecologically and economically, to
have a single transfrontier park rather than several disjointed national ones if strong governance
institutions exist in high-resource potential areas.
Local communities are an important stakeholder in this conservation eﬀort, without whose sup-
port conservation may be diﬃcult, fail to achieve its full potential or merely be a failure. Local
communities will thus have to be included in the beneﬁt stream and the paper shows that as long
as the stream of beneﬁts from the park authority is greater than the stream of beneﬁts from the
alternative sources of income, they would cooperate as they face an opportunity cost for not coop-
15erating. Implementing this successfully requires that the transfrontier park is managed as a single
unit with the possibility of inter-jurisdiction revenue transfers between its constituent sub-units.
Lastly, the paper discusses the threshold of governance institutions required for successful man-
agement of fugitive natural resources. The governance institutions that are likely to promote the
success of a transfrontier park are those which impose high costs for deviant behaviour and equalise
the long-run costs and beneﬁts for all constituencies.
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